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THE GENERAL DEVELOPMENT OF WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION ACTS.*
The common law action to recover damages for employees
injured or killed during the course of their employment has
been found to be unequal to the demands of centralized in-
dustry.1 These rules were worked out to apply to relationships
of comparative simplicity. The employer used but few men;
they knew him and in a general sense were acquainted with each
other-an individualistic affair.
For such conditions the common law rule that an employer
is liable to his injured employee only when the employer is at
fault worked comparative justice to all concerned.
But the advent of modern machinery and the erection of
large factories has taken away the personal relationship between
the employer and his employee. As the relationship distanced,
the employee found it increasingly difficult to prove his master's
negligence. The worker's task was even more difficult because
the three defenses known as (1) the fellow servant rule, (2) the
doctrine known as the voluntary assumption of risk, and (3)
the rule of contributory negligence had been given to the em-
ployer by the courts.
The fellow servant rule of judicial origin, was ingrafted
upon the common law for the protection of the master against
the consequences of negligence in which he had no part. By
degrees it was expanded until under modern industrial condi-
tions it gave opportunity for many harsh and technical de-
fenses.2
It is also urged that the master was liable for injuries
caused to strangers by the acts or defaults of his servants in the
course of their employment but was not liable to one servant
for an act or default of his fellow servant.
3
The workman was placed in a worse position than the out-
sider.
*A study in administrative law submitted to Professor Felix Frank-
furter, Harvard Law School, March, 1924.
'Workmen's Compensation Acts: Their Theory and their Consti-
tutionality. Eugene Wambaugh. 25 Harvard Law Review 129.
2 Workmen's Compensation. Honnold. Vol. 1. Note to section 4.
Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts. Jeremiah Smith. 27
Harvard Law Review 235.
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Under the assumption of risk rule, if the employee knew
the dangers of the employment, he was held to be responsible
for the injury. The workman, who is forced to depend. upon
employment for his bread, often willingly enters upon a task
fraught with more than ordinary dangers without additional
arrangements for compensation. His family must be fed. The
common law made no provision in such a case. 4
It seems that one, who is to blame for his injuries should
not force the consequences upon another, who has not been
negligent at all or whose negligence would not have caused the
accident but for the servant's negligence. And yet, this rule
of contributory negligence has often been a source of great in-
justice in its administration.
Added to these obstacles, the law itself was "for the most
part too uncertain, too dilatory, and too expensive for the aver-
age workman to embark in."5 Time is of the essence in dealing
with compensation for injuries to working men. They can not
afford to wait for a legal remedy nor pay the expense of obtain-
ing one.
Compensation of any kind was not given to exceed 12% of
the cases of injuries to employees and even in those cases in
which compensation was paid, it did not average more than one-
fourth of what is considered to be adequate compensation. 6
If successful in his action, the workman was awarded a
lump sim. Unused to the care of money, this was squandered
as a rule and his family became an object of concern for the
community.
The situation demanded a remedy. The remedy was pro-
vided by workmen's compensation laws.
The idea of workmen's compensation seems to have origi-
nated in Germany; the fertile brain of Bismark crystallized it
there. Prom the enactment of a sick insurance statute in 1883,
the great German workmen's insurance plan has been built up.7
The first Act in Great Britain was in 1897, which only pro-
vided compensation for certain designated employments. In
4 Ast ey v. Evans & Co. (1911), 1 K. B. 1036; Ladd. v. New Bedford
Rai~road Co., 119 Mass. 412.
'Cooper v. Wright (1902), App. Cas. 302.
Industrial Insurance for Workmen. James H. Boyd. 10 Mich. Law
Review.
' Workmen's Compensation Acts. Honnold. Vol. 1, section, it
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1906 Great Britain extended workmen's compensation to all
employments. Statutes embracing upwards of twenty-five
jurisdictions were in force before any similar Act was passed
in the United States.8
Tm THEoRY op WoRxmm-'s COMPMTSATION LAws.
Industrial accidents may be put into two classes, the pre-
ventible and the inevitable.9 Preventible accidents are usually
the result of the negligence of the employer or of the employee.
Inevitable accidents result from the ordinary hazard of the
industry and cannot be classed as due to the negligence of
either the employer or the employee.
In spite of all precautions accidents, which are inevitable,
occur in all industries. Powder factories blow up; often the
cause is never ascertained. A workman is stricken with a dis-
ease which is a result of his occupation. No matter how care-
ful the employer and employee may be or how many laws society
may pass for their mutual protection, this type of accident will
continue to be present in some degree. At this time, at least,
statistics show that nearly 55% of industrial accidents are the
result of the natural hazard of the business.' 0
At common law, preventible accidents due to the negligence
of the employer were recognized as part of the cost of produc-
tion. The employer either paid damages and charged it to the
cost of production or took out liability insurance and charged
the premuims to the cost of operation.
At common law the employee suffered for accidents due to
his negligence. He could recover no damages.
Neither the employer nor the employee should suffer for
accidents due to the hazard of the industry. Such loss should
be borne by the ultimate consumer of the product of the in-
dustry.It was well said in an editorial in the Outlook of March 1,
1913: "When a machine is injured in the course of its use, the
owner of the machine bears the cost of the injury and charges
it to the expense of production, for which he receives payment
8 See the article by Eugene Wambaugh, cited (1), supra.
9 See Second Annual Report, Workmen's Compensation Board of
Kentucky..
"Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Law. Dosker. Page 5.
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as he sells his goods. When, however, a workman is injured in
the course of his employment, the cost of the injury comes upon
him, who can ill afford to bear it; and if his injury is serious,
resulting in long incapacity for work or in death, he is drafted
into that great army of dependents, that is a reproach to our
civilization. There is no reason that common sense can accept
why the cost in human efficiency and human life of the produc-
tion of the things that people need should not be charged to the
account of that production, just as is charged the cost of injury
to machinery."
Workmen's compensation laws proceed on the theory that
the "injured workman is entitled to pecuniary relief from the
distress caused by his injury, as a matter of right, unless his
own willful act is the proximate cause, and that it is wholly
immaterial whether the injury can be traced to the negligence
of the master, the negligence of the injured employee, or a fel-
low servant, or whether it results from an act of God, the public
enemy, an unavoidable accident, or a mere hazard of the busi-
ness, which may or may not be subject to more exact classifica-
tion. 11
The economic principle of workmen's compensation laws is
that both preventible and enevitable accidents should be borne
by the cost of production. Industry hs always borne the bur-
den of depreciation and destruction of machinery; it should also
bear the burden of repairing the efficiency of the human ma-
chinery, which is so necessary to production.
PROGRESS OP THE MOVEMENT IN THE UMTrED STATES.
The agitation for workmen's compensation became active
in the United States in the first decade of the Twentieth Cen-
tury.
In 1902 a limited provision applying compulsory co-opera-
tlive insurance to a few employments was passed in Maryland
but was declared unconstitutional because of improper delega-
tion of judicial functions, in April, 1904, by an inferior court,
and no appeal was taken from that decision.12 Another statute
applying to limited employment was adopted in 1910.13
"Judge Holloway's Opinion in 155 Pac. 268.
"Workmen's Compensation Acts. A Problem in the Drafting of.
Francis H. Bohlen. 25 Harvard Law Review 328.
uSee Prof. Wambaugh's article (1), supra, at page 132, note 4.
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The Federal Employerse Liability Act of 1906 was not a
workmen's compensation act but an employers' liability law.14
Its purpose was the redress of injuries to railroad employees.
It was declared unconstitutional as embracing intra-state mat-
ters; with which Congress had no power to deal. A new Federal
Act was passed in 1908. It excluded injuries due to the negli-
gence or misconduct of the employee as did the act of 1906 and
cannot be called for that reason a workmen's compensation
act.1 5
In 1903 a commission was appointed by the Governor of
Massachusetts under authority of the legislature to study the
relations of employers and employees. It recommended a com-
pensation act, fashioned after that of Great Britain, to the legis-
lature in 1904.16 The act failed to pass. It was a new idea
with the public and employers feared that the added burden its
passage would entail on industries would hamper them in
competition with other states. This latter reason held the pass-
age of workmen's compensation back in more than one instance.
A similar measure was introduced each year without success
until a special committee.was appointed in 1907, whose majority
favored a voluntary law which permitted employers and em-
ployees by contract to substitute a plan of compensation for
their legal liability. The minority favored a compulsory com-
pensation act. The legislature enacted the report of the majority
in 1908. But contracts thus made were only for one year and
employers found it too expensive to try to operate under a law
sanctioning such frequent changes. It was a failure.
Another comission was appointed; another act was drawn
up and enacted in 1911, pr6viding for voluntary, mutual insur-
ance of employees by employers.
Meanwhile in 1910, New York had passed a compulsory
compensation law applying to certain hazardous occupations.
It was declared unconstitutional in the celebrated case of Ives
v. South Buffalo By. Co. as in conflict with both the federal and
1,Workmen's Compensation. Van Doren. Page 51.
11See (1), supra.
"Report of Mass. Com. for Industrial Accidents. 1912. Page 14.
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state constitutions, the Fourteenth Amendment of the former
and Art. 1, section 6 of the latter, which forbids the taking of
public property without due process of law.17
New York in 1910 also passed a voluntary compensation
act, which the employer and employee could by agreement sub-
stitute for the prevailing system. This law was similar to the
Massachussetts law but went further in that it prescribed the
scale of benefits which should be paid when agreements under it
were made.
Montana's act applying to miners only was declared un-
constitutional on the ground that it submitted the employer to
a double liability. This was because of negligent drafting,
which failed to protect the employer from an action at law after
paying compensation under the act.
In 1911 ten states-California, Illinois, Kansas, Massachu-
setts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Washington,
and Wisconsin-adopted compensation acts. Arizona, Maryland,
(with a remodeled act), Michigan, and Rhode Island followed
in 1912. Then Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, Ore-
gon, Texas, and West Virginia joined the ranks. In 1914 Ken-
tucky and Louisiana passed compensation acts. The Kentucky
act was declared unconstitutional and a valid act was passed in
1916. Between the years 1910 and 1920 there had been work-
men's compensation and industrial insurance laws enacted in
forty-two states.' s
As noted above, the 1914 session of the Kentucky General
Assembly enacted a workmen's compensation law, which was
held unconstitutional by the State Court of Appeals in the ease
of Kentucky State Journal v. Workmen's Compensation Board,
161 Ky. 562; 170 S. W. 1166. This act shall be considered in
a later section.
The restrictions which the court's construction of the state
constitution laid down in that opinion accounts for some of the
provisions in the 1916 act.
In April, 1915, after a somewhat informal correspondence
between the representatives of the various interests most directly
affected, a Voluntaiy Investigating Commission was organ-
IT 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431 (1911).
13 Workmen's Compensation. Harper. Page 16.
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ized. 19 This commission consisted of four representatives of
the Kentucky State Federation of Labor, three from the Ken-
tucky Manufacturers and Shippers Association, two from the
Kentocky Mine Owners Association, and one representative
from the Attorney General's Department
This commission held monthly sessions in Louisville during
1915 and offered a draft of a compensation bill to the 1916 Gen-
eral Assembly. It was adopted, practically, as offered at that
session.
The only substantial changes made by the legislature were
the penalty provisions for intentional injury in Section 4882,
the scale of benefits to alien dependents in Section 4903, and the
method of computing weekly wages in Section 4905.
The requirements of the Kentucky Constitution, as pre-
viously construed by the courts, accounted for the unusual pro-
vision of Section 4893, allowing a recovery of one hundred dol-
lars by the persoiial representative and the provision in Section
4957 providing for express written acceptance of the act by indi-
vidual employees.
Governor Stanley approved the act on March 14, 1916, and
by its terms it became effective as to the appointment of the
board and their "rights, powers, and duties" on the first day
of April, 1916, becoming fully operative as between' employer
and employee on August 1, 1916.
THE KENTucKy AcT.
The Kentucky act 20 provides an elective system of work-
men's compensation for industrial accidents. The act applies
to "all employers having three or more employees regularly
engaged in the same occupation, except that it does not apply
to domestic employment, agriculture, steam railways, or such
common carriers other than steam railways for which a rule of
liability is provided by the laws of the United States."
Neither the employer nor the employee is brought under
the provisions of the statute until he accepts them in writing.
Withdrawal is also in writing.
10 The discussion follows accounts in the annual reports of the Ken-
tucky Compensation Board.
2" Kentucky Statutes, chapter 137. Carroll's Kentucky Statutes is
cited In this paper.
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Whenever both employer and employee have accepted the
benefits of the act, all liability under the common law is swept
away except in the case where there is a penalty for intentional
injury in Section 4882.
That section contains an ambiguity. One part specifies
that "if injury or death result to an employee through the de-
liberate intention of his employer to produce such injury or
death, the employee or his dependants . . . . shall receive
the amount provided in this act in a lump sum to be used, if
they so desire to prosecute the employer, and said dependants
shall be permitted to bring suit against said employer for any
amount they may desire." This part of the section manifestly
gives both compensation as provided by the statute though in
a lump sum and in addition the employee may pursue his com-
mon law action.
And yet, the employee is forced to an election to take under
the statute or bring suit at law by the following words of the
same section: "if injury or death results to an employee through
the deliberate intention of his employer to produce such injury
or death, the employee or his dependants, ..... .. shall
have the privilege to take under this act, or in lieu thereof to
have a cause of action at law against such employer, as if this
act had not been passed, for such damages so sustained by the
employee, his dependents, or personal representative, as may
be recoverable at law."
It is said that the first part of the section quoted was hastily
constructed and placed in the section as an amendment, while
the act was being argued on the floor of the senate. 21
Doubtless the courts will construe the section in the light
that the "spirit of the law and not the letter should control its
construction, and in considering the object to be accomplished
decide that an election of one remedy will preclude the other
being followed." 22
If the employer does not elect to operate under the provis-
ions of the act and he is sued at law to recover for injuries or
death to an employee by accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment, the employer cannot defend on the
2See (10), supra, page 86.
= 128 Ky. 324.
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usual grounds of contributory negligence, negligence of a fel-
low servant, or assumption of risk.23
If the employer elects to come under the act and the em-
ployee does not, such defenses are available to the employer in
case of action by the employee.
Excepted employments may be brought under the act by
the joint application of the employer and the employee. 24  The
acceptance is binding for the period stated in the application
and until written revocation is filed with the board.
Under the act employers accepting its provisions must in-
sure and keep insured their liability for compensation in some
corporation, association, or organization authorized to transact
the business of workmen's compensation in Kentucky or furnish
to the board proof of financial ability to pay compensation
direct.25
In addition to the authorization of insurance in stock com-
panies, mutuals, and reciprocals, state insurance was provided
by the act.26
But through the power of the board to regulate rates27 no
disposition was shown to organize the state mutual until the
initial result of the board in fixing rates could be ascertained. 28
It developed that the larger stock companies did not submit
rates to the board individually but delegated the matter to the
Workmen's Compensation Service Bureau of New York of which
they were members, so it became a question to be determined
between the board and this bureau. Feeling their inability to
cope with the technicalities of the subject, the board employed
Dr. I. 1M. Rubinow of New York, who has a national reputation
in this field. Dr. Rubinow recommended a rate substantially
lower than that originally submitted to the board by the bureau.
The Kentucky rate of compensation is 65% of the average
weekly wage and the board's approval of a law-differential of
144 and a multiplier of 252 plus one cent gives Kentucky, con-
sidering its rate of compensation, very low insurance rates. The
"West Kentucky Coal Co. v. Smithers, 184 Ky. 211; Lombery v.
Central Consumers' Co., 184 Ky. 284.
2 McCune v. William B. Pel, 192 Ky. 22.
"Kentucky Statutes, section 4946. et seq.
"0Kentucky Statutes, section 4969 to section 4986, incI.
"Kentucky Statutes, section 4955.
2Annual Report of Kentucky Compensation Board, 1916-17, page 9.
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Workmen's Compensation Service Bureau refused to accept the
board's rate and left it to the verious insurance companies to
act independently.
Only twenty-seven insurance companies wrote insurance
at the rate fixed the first year. But the low rate and the liberal
own-risk policy adopted by the board had the effect of causing
no interest to be manifested in the organization of the state
mutual.
The low rate continued to prove so attractive that only
123 out of 4007 employers accepting the act were carrying their
own risk at the end of the first fiscal year. Later figures are
not available to the writer but the number of own-risk carriers
continues to be low, made up largely of large concerns employ-
ing a sufficient number of men to equalize the risk.
The act provides for a merit rating schedule so that due
allowance may be made for the hazard of the business, the in-
stallation and care of safety devices and the accident record
of the particular employer. From the standpoint of cold dol-
lars and cents, as well as from a humanitarian viewpoint the
employer can well afford to install safety devices in order to
decrease his rate as well as to minimize accidents.2 9
The benefits under the act may be classified as follows:
A. Death Benefits.30
(a) If death results within two years, burial expenses not
to exceed $75.
(b) If there are no dependents, the further sum of $100
to the personal representative of the deceased em-
ployee.
(c) To persons wholly dependent, 65% of the average
weekly earnings of the deceased, but not less than $5
per week nor more than $12 shall be paid for 335 weeks
but in no case to exceed the maximum sum of $4,000.
(d) If there are only partial dependents, who survive the
deceased, the payments shall be proportional to total
dependency.
2 Kentucky Statutes, section 4955.
-"Kentucky Statutes, section 4893, et seq.
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B. Compenmation for Total Disability.
(a) Weekly compensation equal to 65% of the average
weekly earnings, not to exceed $15 nor less than $5 per
week for a period not longer than eight years, nor to
exceed a maximum sum of $6,000, including partial dis-
ability payments, if any. Certain injuries are deemed
to constitute permanent total disability.
C. Compensatiom for Partial Disability.
(a) If temporary, 65% of the difference between the em-
ployee's average weekly earnings after the accident
and his average weekly earnings before the accident,
not to exceed 333 weeks; not exceeding the sum of $15
per week nor the maximum total of $4,000.
(b) If an injured employee refused employment reason-
ably suited to his capacity and physical condition, he
shall not be entitled to compensation during the period
of such refusal, unless, in the opinion of the board, such
refusal was justified.
(c) Lump sum awards may be made after six months if
approved by the board.
Following the lead and policy incorporated in the com-
pensation acts of many of the states, the Kentucky act originally
provided for a two weeks' waiting period, during which the in-
jured employee received no compensation. This waiting period
was reduced to seven days upon the recommendation of the
board, the amendment taking effect August 1, 1918. 31
An appropriation of $7,500 was recommended by the Vol-
untary Commission in their draft of the bill which they pre-
sented to the legislature and that amount was accordingly ap-
propriated by the legislature to defray the initial expense of
getting the commission going until the first income should accrue
from the premium tax32
This premium tax was a 4% tax on net premiums of in-
surance carried by employers and was collected from insurance
carriers to pay the salaries and necessary expenses of the board
and to provide a general maintenance fund for carrying out the
"Annual Report of Kentucky Compensation Board, 1917-18, page, 21.
"See (28), supra, page 13.
WORMmN'S COMPENSATION ACTS
provisions of the act.33 It was augmented by an assessment of
47 of what the Basic Manual insurance premiums would have
been upon the payroll of those employers who elected to carry
their own risk.
The income derived from this source proved to be more than
enough to satisfy the financial needs of carrying on the duties
of the board, so an amendment was passed by the 1920 session
of the legislature, requiring insurance carriers to pay a 2%
tax, but the board is not authorized to make an assessment
against the own-risk employers unless the maintenance funid at
the end of any fiscal year is below $60,000. This amendment be-
came effective June 16, 1920.34
One amendment to the act shows the favorable impression
created by the act, both among employers and employees in Ken-
tucky. The act as originally passed applied to "all employers
having five or more employees regularly engaged in the same oc-
cupation or business and to their employees" unless within the
excepted employments. This section was amended by the legis-
lature in 1918 by reducing the minimum number of employees
from "five" to "three."
This legislative act was urged by capital and labor alike
and mirrors the "favorable sentiment in Kentucky towards the
entire system of workmen's compensation as a substitute for
the old common law liability of master and servant."35
In June, 1922, 9718 employers were operating under the
act. -Withdrawals have been few in number, resulting largely
from cessation of operations or mere change of name.
During the year 1921-1922, 18,611 accidents were reported
to the board. Agreements in the case of 10,000 of these were
approved by the board. The others were adjusted by render-
ing formal awards, adjusting formal claims upon recommenda-
tion of the board, or dismissal.3 6
Roy MOnELAND, Attorney-at-Law.
Lexington, Kentucky.
(To be continued.)
= Kentucky Statutes, section 4968.
'4Annual Report of Kentucky Compensation Board, 1919-20, page 5.25See (31), supra, page 22.
3, During the fiscal year of 1920-21, 561 formal claims were filed
with the board. The board rendered 129 formal awards, adjusted 291
claims by recommendation and dismissed 134 claims. A few cases were
mot disposed of.
